The judicial review of regulatory agencies' decisions, and of statutory enactments with important economic content, presents unique and persistent problems. These decisions are often technical and complex, and the judicial review is usually performed by non-specialists who often seek to provide clear rules and predictability, not case-by-case economic balancing of their own. Sound economic policy requires a balancing of both costs and benefits and demand and supply. In Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review (AEI Press, March 2004)--an essay first presented in December 2003 as the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies' 2003 Distinguished Lecture--Stephen G. Breyer, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, discusses these dilemmas in the context of recent Supreme Court decisions and offers suggestions for addressing them. In order to bring economic reasoning to bear in legal fields, such as antitrust law, intellectual property law, and economic regulation, Justice Breyer recommends the following: The law must take into greater consideration the underlying human purposes of the law, rather than simply favor strict legal categories. Courts should consider using independent experts for economic reasoning in technical areas rather than sending judges to economic seminars. These experts should understand the role that administrative considerations, such as the need for rules, play in the law. Given the law's reluctance to rely upon novel approaches, institutions outside the judiciary should debate and adopt economic methods for the courts to model. The legal process, Justice Breyer argues, "is too important to be left simply to the legal specialists, to the lawyers, or even to the judges." Those with basic economic or regulatory policymaking expertise need to participate in the judicial process. Whether serving as experts in individual cases or informed court watchers and critics, these experts can help lawyers and judges understand the tools of analysis and encourage their use. Justice Breyer has long been a leader in the quest to build a rational consensus on the appropriate role of government intervention in a market-based economy. As counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, he was one of the chief architects of airline deregulation. As a Harvard University law professor and a Supreme Court Justice, he has made seminal contributions to the understanding of social and economic regulation, copyright law, and administrative law. Justice Breyer is the author of Regulation and Its Reform (Harvard, 1992) and Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Harvard, 1993).
The decisions courts make in constitutional rights cases pervade our political life and touch on our most basic interests and values. The spread of judicial review of legislation around the world means that courts are increasingly called on to settle matters of moral and political controversy, including assisted suicide, data privacy, anti-terrorism measures, marriage, and abortion. But doubts regarding the institutional capacities of courts for deciding such questions are growing. Judges now regularly review social science research to assess whether a law will effectively achieve its aim, and at what cost to other interests. They cite studies and statistical information from psychology, sociology, medicine, and other disciplines in which they are rarely trained. This empirical reasoning proceeds alongside open-ended moral reasoning, with judges employing terms such as equality, liberty, and autonomy, then determining what these require in concrete circumstances. This book shows that courts were not designed for this kind of moral and empirical reasoning. It argues that in comparison to legislatures, the institutional capacities of courts are deficient. Legislatures are better equipped than courts for deliberating and decision-making in regard to the kinds of factual and moral issues that arise in constitutional rights cases. The book concludes by considering the implications of comparative institutional capacity for constitutional design. Is a system of judicial review of legislation something that constitutional framers should choose to adopt? If so, in what form? For countries with systems of judicial review, practical proposals are made to remedy deficiencies in the institutional capacities of courts.
This insightful single-volume compilation brings together the most important contemporary work by experts in the economic analysis of legal reasoning and interpretation. The collection explores a wide range of topics in the field, from constitutional to statutory interpretation, precedent and the interpretation of contracts. The articles raise key questions concerning the optimal construction of institutions, the best approach to judicial decision-making, and the best strategies for statutory and contract drafting. Prefaced by an original introduction by the editor, this collection will be valuable to academics interested in legal reasoning, economic analysis and legal philosophy.
Examining the law of judicial review in the context of commercial regulation, this book provides a critical view of British courts' deferential attitude to commercial regulation. It advocates a more intensive form of review based on the principle of proportionality which is more satisfactory in terms of individual justice.
In the United Kingdom during the past decade, individuals and groups have increasingly tested the extent to which principles of English administrative law can be used to gain entitlements to health and welfare services and priority for the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. One of the primary purposes of this book is to demonstrate the extent to which established boundaries of judicial intervention in socio-economic disputes have been altered by the extension of judicial powers in sections 3 and 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and through the development of a jurisprudence of positive obligations in the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. Thus, the substantive focus of the book is on developments in the constitutional law of the United Kingdom. However, the book also addresses key issues of theoretical human rights, international and comparative constitutional law. Issues of justiciability in English administrative law have therefore been explored against a background of two factors: a growing acceptance of the need for balance in the protection in modern constitutional arrangements afforded to civil and political rights on the one hand and socio-economic rights on the other hand; and controversy as to whether courts could make a more effective contribution to the protection of socio-economic rights with the assistance of appropriately tailored constitutional provisions.
Fernando Castillo de la Torre and Eric Gippini Fournier, two of the most experienced competition litigators at the European Commission, undertake an in-depth analysis of the case law of the EU Courts on the rules of evidence, proof and judicial review, as they are applied in EU competition law. These topics often engage with fundamental rights, and the book takes stock of the most frequent criticisms that are made of the EU enforcement system and review by EU Courts. The result is an extremely thorough and well-structured review of the relevant rules of law and of the precedents. The authors combine valuable insights and critical analysis to construct a definitive yet balanced portrayal of the state of EU competition law.
Lord Slynn of Hadley is one of the outstanding judges of his time. He has served as a High Court Judge, as an Advocate General and a Judge of the European Court of Justice, and he has been a Lord of Appeal for ten years. This Liber Amicorum bears testimony to the international reputation that he has achieved for his judgments and for his scholarship. In the many distinguished contributions, judges from international courts and from Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts, together with academics from leading universities around the world, have taken the opportunity to celebrate the accomplishments of Lord Slynn's legal career thus far, and also to discuss areas of law where Lord Slynn can be expected to give important impulses to further development. `Mr Gordon Slynn was outstanding. The best I have ever known. He will go far.' Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, 1980.
Supreme Court Economic Review
Author: Jonathan Klick, Eric Helland
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
The Supreme Court Economic Review is a faculty-edited, peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary law and economics series with a particular focus on economic and social science analysis of judicial decision making, institutional analysis of law and legal structures, political economy and public choice issues regarding courts and other decision-makers, and the relationship between legal and political institutions and the institutions of a free society governed by constitutions and the rule of law. Contributors include renowned legal scholars, economists, and policy-makers, and consistently ranks among the most influential journals of law and economics.
This book offers a new interpretation of judicial review in England and Wales as being concerned with the advancement of justice and good governance, as opposed to being concerned primarily with ultra vires or common law constitutionalism. It is developed both from examining the functions and values that ought to be served by judicial review, and from analysis of empirical 'social' facts about judicial review primarily as experienced in the Administrative Court. Based on ground-up case law analysis it constructs a new taxonomy on the grounds of judicial review: mistake, procedural impropriety, ordinary common law statutory interpretation, discretionary impropriety, relevant/irrelevant considerations, breach of an ECHR protected right orequality duty, and constitutional allocation of powers, constitutional rights, or other complex constitution principles. It explains each of these grounds, what academic and judicial support there might be for them outside case law analysis, and their similarities and differences when viewed against popular existing taxonomies. It concludes that Administrative Court judges are engaged in ordinary common law statutory interpretation in approximately half of all cases, and that where discretionary judgement is involved on the part of the initial decision-maker, judges do indeed consider their task to be one of determining whether the challenged decision was justified by reasoning of adequate quality. It finds that judges apply ordinary common law principles of statutory interpretation with historical pedigrees, including assessing the initial decision-maker's reasoning with reference to statutory purpose, and sifting relevant from irrelevant considerations, including moral considerations. The result is a ground-breaking reassessment of the grounds of judicial review in England and Wales and the practice of the Administrative Court.
Competition Law and Economics
Author: Abel Moreira Mateus, Teresa Coelho Moreira
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Mateus and Moreira present a formidable review of pressing issues in competition law and economics. Top officials, judges and experts from Europe and North America offer their insights into analytical issues, practical problems for companies, enforcers and complainants and on the state of trans-Atlantic divergence and convergence. The discussion on national champions and state aid is prescient. Throughout, the analysis is acute, cutting edge, and deep. Officials, counsel and scholars will draw from this fabulous book for years to come. Philip Marsden, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, UK Competition policy is at a crossroads on both sides of the Atlantic. In this insightful book, judges, enforcers and academics in law and economics look at the consensus built so far and clarify controversies surrounding the issue. There is broad consensus on the fight against cartels, with some countries criminalizing this type of agreement. However there is also wide debate on the questions of monopolization and abuse of dominant position, vividly highlighted by the recent Microsoft case. Furthermore, there are today diverging views on the interplay of business strategies and the control of market power on both a national and international scale. The book discusses the perennial issue in Europe of the conflicts between competition and industrial policies, once again bringing the theme of national champions to the fore. The contributing authors provide opinion on the efforts which have been made towards modernization in both the USA and the EU. Featuring new contributions by leading scholars and practitioners in antitrust, this book will be a great resource for antitrust enforcers, competition lawyers and practitioners and competition economists, as well as scholars and graduate students in antitrust and competition law.
This text for law students and practitioners examines the way in which judges reason about rules and principles of law both when following existing precedents and creating new ones. Looks at the doctrine of precedent and how it has developed in the Australian judicial system. Discusses the kinds of reasoning judges can use when they are not bound to, or wish to avoid a precedent. Includes a table of cases, a table of legislation and an index. MacAdam is a senior lecturer and Pyke is a lecturer in the faculty of law, Queensland University of Technology.
The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. Sunstein offers a close analysis of the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. Why? For one thing, critics and adversaries who would never agree on fundamental ideals are often willing to accept the concrete details of a particular decision. Likewise, a plea bargain for someone caught exceeding the speed limit need not--indeed, must not--delve into sweeping issues of government regulation and personal liberty. Thus judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies. Sunstein calls such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning--and as a central part of constitutional thinking in America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe-- he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork (who champions the original understanding of the Constitution) to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and Ronald Dworkin, who defends an ambitious role for courts in the elaboration of rights. Equally important, Sunstein goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. For example, he cites Griswold v. Connecticut, a groundbreaking case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married couples--a law that was no longer enforced by prosecutors. In overturning the legislation, the Court invoked the abstract right of privacy; the author asserts that the justices should have appealed to the narrower principle that citizens need not comply with laws that lack real enforcement. By avoiding large-scale issues and values, such a decision could have led to a different outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that upheld Georgia's rarely prosecuted ban on sodomy. And by pointing to the need for flexibility over time and circumstances, Sunstein offers a novel understanding of the old ideal of the rule of law. Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. This book helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing the interpretation of the Constitution or the spell cast by the revolutionary Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In his flexible, practical approach to legal reasoning, he moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: the legislatures elected by the people.
This is the second edition of Hart's leading book on the principle and practice of judicial review in Northern Ireland. Providing a fully updated account of the ever-burgeoning body of case law, it divides into eight chapters that consider the purposes of judicial review; the nature of the public-private divide in Northern Ireland law; the judicial review procedure; the grounds for review; and remedies. As with the first edition, the focus of the book is very much on case law that is unique to Northern Ireland, and the book identifies some important differences between principle and practice in Northern Ireland and England and Wales. It also considers the leading Human Rights Act decisions of the Northern Ireland courts and the House of Lords and UK Supreme Court.The book has been written primarily for practitioners of judicial review and uses numbered paragraphs for ease of reference. The book is, however, of much wider interest and is a valuable resource for academics and students alike. Much of the Northern Ireland case law has been concerned with contentious political issues, and the courts have had to consider difficult questions of the constitutional limits to the judicial role in review proceedings. The book should therefore be of use not just to practitioners but also to those involved in the study of judicial reasoning in different jurisdictions (both within the UK and elsewhere).
Available as a single volume or as part of the 10 volume set Supreme Court in American Society
From a comparative perspective, this book deals with the question of the impact of European law, especially the Tetra Laval case-law, on the standard of review applied by national courts in the area of competition law and economic regulation. The book is a follow-up to the conference on 'Judicial review in competition law and economic regulation, ' held by the Europa Institute at Utrecht on May 23-24, 2008. It contains contributions by academics and practitioners from EU Member States and from European institutions. The book analyzes the differences and the similarities between the crucial concepts related to judicial review and the way judicial review functions in practice in different EU Member States. It examines the question as to whether a more common approach towards judicial review is needed, and if so, how this can be achieved